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Abstract
This article argues that major cases of electoral reform across democracies in Asia
in recent years can be explained as institutional measures aimed at curbing corruption
and ‘money politics’. More specifically, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand rid themselves of
their extreme candidate-centered electoral systems as a means to encourage politicians
to invest in ‘clean’ collective party labels, while Indonesia discarded its extremely party-
centered electoral system to increase the accountability of individual politicians. The
article thus disagrees with scholars who argue that recent electoral reform should be
understood as part of a wider project by Asian governments to engineer a majoritarian
form of democracy. Instead, the comparative analysis shows that democracies across
Asia, in line with global trends in institutional design, have been ‘normalizing’ their
electoral systems, moving them closer towards the ideal of electoral ‘efficiency’.
Introduction
A scholarly debate has emerged over whether Asian democracies – against the
general global trend in institutional design – are moving towards Lijphart’s (1999)
model of ‘majoritarian democracy’. While Reilly is the most vocal advocate of this
thesis, arguing that ‘there has been a convergence in recent years on an identifiable
“Asian model” of democracy characterized by aggregative electoral politics, centrist
political competition, and, in some cases, nascent two-party systems’ (2007a: 1351),
Croissant and Scha¨chter (2010) find no supporting empirical evidence.
The literature also provides contradicting evidencewhenwedisaggregate Lijphart’s
models of democracy and focus on what is commonly considered the key institutional
component – namely, the electoral system.Whereas the ‘Asianmodel’ hypothesis argues
that democracies across the region have in recent years adopted majoritarian electoral
systems in an attempt to engineer stable governments and facilitate more efficient –
that is, less consensual – policymaking (Reilly, 2007a, 2007b; Rock, 2013), a comparative
reviewof single-country studies of electoral reform suggests a different picture: electoral
reformwas not driven by a deliberate effort tomanufacture two-party systems; instead,
all major electoral reforms had the objective of tackling problems of ‘money politics’
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and corruption. Put in more abstract terms, single-country studies seem to agree that,
to strengthen the accountability of politicians, electoral reformwas aimed at re-shaping
competitive patterns within parties, rather than between parties.
Existing explanations of electoral reform in Asia thus focus on very different
aspects of electoral systems. While the ‘Asian model’ hypothesis emphasizes the
interparty dimension, single-country studies imply that institutional reform intended
to reposition electoral systems on the intraparty dimension. To adjudicate between
these two opposing views, this paper will provide a quantitative ‘mapping’ of electoral
reform inAsia through a two-dimensional framework,which allows todirectly compare
shifts on both the interparty and intraparty dimension. This exercise will show that the
most significant transformation of electoral systems in Asia over the last two decades
has happened on the intraparty rather than the interparty dimension. More generally,
the evidence suggests that Asian democracies have been ‘normalizing’ their electoral
systems rather than working towards an ‘Asian model’ of governance based on the
‘winner takes all principle’.
Electoral systems: interparty and intraparty effects
In a review of the academic literature on electoral systems, Shugart (2005: 29–30)
summarizes that ‘[m]ost research over several decades of the development of the field
has been concerned with how electoral systems affect the translation of votes into seats
for competing political parties, and how electoral systems affect the overall nature of
the party system – basically, the number of parties and how proportional the allocation
is among them’. The general consensus that has emerged from this research is that the
district magnitude of an electoral system – that is, the number of parliamentary seats
per constituency – has the greatest effect on proportionality: the larger the district
magnitude, the more proportional the translation of votes to seats (see, for example,
Lijphart, 1994).
Proportionality, in turn, influences the number of parties in a party system: as
proportionality increases, so does party system fragmentation (Taagepera and Shugart,
1989: 142–55). There is therefore a link between district magnitude and the number of
parties in party system: electoral systemswith a smaller districtmagnitudewill facilitate
the emergence of a two-party system, while electoral systems with a larger district
magnitude will promote a multi-party system. However, it is widely acknowledged
that the relationship between district magnitude and party system fragmentation also
depends on other factors. For example, Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) show that the
number of parties is the product of both the ‘permissiveness’ of the electoral system
and the degree of social heterogeneity. Similarly, Moser and Scheiner (2012) argue that
whether electoral systems have a reductive effect on party system fragmentation is
determined by the level of party institutionalization and voters’ ability to gauge the
competitiveness of the different parties.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that district magnitude has been found to have the
largest influence on the proportionality of election results,most existing categorizations
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of electoral systems are actually based on the electoral formula – that is, the method by
whichvotes are translated into seats (Farrell, 2011:6). The threemain families of electoral
systems distinguished are thus majoritarian/pluralitarian, proportional representation
(PR), andmix-member systems. Lijphart’s models of democracy, too, make reference to
the dichotomy between majoritarian/pluralitarian and proportional electoral systems.
However, this is amere heuristic device; ultimately, Lijphart is interested in the output of
electoral systems, rather than theirmechanical components.Whereas the ‘majoritarian’
model of democracy is characterized by high levels of disproportionality and a two-
party system, the ‘consensus’ model of democracy features highly proportional election
results and a multi-party system (Lijphart, 1999).
A growing number of scholars are starting to realize, however, that, by focusing
‘on the distinction between majority and proportional rules’, many classifications and
analyses of electoral systems ‘address only party representation, but neglect the second
essential element of any electoral system: personal representation’ (Colomer, 2011: 2,
emphasis added by the author). In other words, existing research places heavy emphasis
on the interparty dimension – that is, the question of how voting rules affect the
allocation of seats to parties – but has largely ignored the intraparty dimension – that
is, the question of how electoral institutions affect the allocation of seats to candidates.
Aiming to deal with this shortcoming, a number of authors have developed
alternative classifications of electoral systems based on the ballot structure – that is,
the degree of voter choice offered by the electoral system. For example, Shugart (2005:
37–8; also see Colomer, 2011: 8–11) organizes his classification around two questions:
does the electoral system specify an allocation process for converting votes into seats (1)
among parties and/or (2) among candidates? Based on the resulting two-dimensional
matrix, three broad families of electoral systems can be distinguished: under closed-
list systems, parties present ranked ballots and voters simply select one party list over
another; the electoral rules do thus not specify the allocation of seats to candidates.
Under nominal systems (or non-list systems), voters vote for candidates by name; the
electoral rules, in otherwords, specifywhich individual candidates obtain seats.1 Finally,
preferential list systems specify allocation criteria on both the interparty and intraparty
dimension: ‘Individual candidates compete for votes, as in nominal systems, but these
votes are aggregated at the level of a party list, as in closed-list systems’ (ibid: 39). The
main subtypes of preferential list systems are open-list systems and flexible-list systems.2
These different electoral system types place a significant constraint on politicians’
electoral strategies. Broadly speaking, a politician needs to decide whether he or she
1 Non-list systems can again be distinguished along two further questions: does voting take place in a
single-member or multi-member constituency; and are voters provided with a categorical or an ordinal
ballot?
2 Under open-list systems, ‘the ballots provided by parties are unranked and preference votes alone
determine the order of election from a party’s list’. On the other hand, under flexible-list systems,
usually ‘some quota is defined . . . Obtaining a quota of preference votes guarantees a candidate will be
elected regardless of his or her rank on the list.’
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wants to campaign on a personal vote – that is, on ‘his or her personal qualities,
qualifications, activities, and record’ (Cain et al., 1984: 9) – or a party vote – that is, by
investing in a collective party reputation.While under closed-list systems the incentives
for cultivating a personal vote are almost zero, other electoral system types – because
they allow voters to vote for candidates by name – give politicians stronger incentives
for personal vote-seeking. This is especially true for those systems that pit candidates
of the same party against each other in the same district: preferential list systems and
non-list systems withmulti-member districts. Under such electoral rules, the challenge
for candidates is to find away to set themselves apart from their co-partisan contenders.
The most effective way for candidates to do so is to ‘differentiate themselves on the
basis of their ability to provide particularistic goods’ (Cox and Thies, 1998: 269).
There are, in general, three different strategies throughwhich individual candidates
can deliver particularistic goods to voters: (1) governmental ‘pork’, (2) clientelism,
and (3) vote buying. Usually, pork is aimed at larger groups of voters (for example,
neighborhoods or other communities), while clientelism and vote buying are targeted
at individual voters. The latter two strategies differ in that clientelism comes with
‘electoral strings’ attached: material benefits are only distributed to voters who have
already delivered or who promise to deliver their votes (Hicken, 2011).
However, as with the interparty dimension, it is important to take into
considerationother factorswhen explaining the constraining effects of electoral systems
on politicians’ vote-seeking strategies. As a number of authors point out, the electoral
system alone is never a sufficient condition for the emergence of particularistic electoral
strategies (see, for example, Hicken, 2006a; Samuels, 1999). On the ‘demand side’, the
efficiency of strategies such as clientelism and vote buying is driven by the degree to
which voters depend on particularistic benefits to maintain their standard of living.
More specifically, a voter’s ‘reservationprice’ – that is, the price atwhich voterswill trade
their vote for a particularistic benefit – ‘will be set at a level that is at or above what he
can easily procure through his own efforts in the private market’ (Lyne, 2007: 164). This
means that clientelism and vote buying tend to thrive when poverty is widespread. On
the other hand, under conditions of economic development and rising living standards,
‘supply-side’ factors gain in importance. In particular, clientelism will be difficult to
maintain without ‘large-scale public enterprise and “planned” political economies’ as
such regulatory policies provide politicians with a large supply of public resources to
keep up with voters’ growing reservation price (Kitschelt et al., 2010: 41). Even more
critically, political parties need to have access to these public resources; parties that are
excluded from access will have to develop policy-based appeals (Shefter, 1977).
Finally, as for the interparty dimension, there arewider socio-political implications
to consider. Most significantly, a growing body of literature explores the negative
effects of pervasive personal vote-seeking on democracy and general social welfare. For
example, Chang makes a strong connection between the personal vote and corruption:
‘When dependence on the personal vote rises in elections, candidates need more
campaign resources to advertise their individual candidacies. However, these personal
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vote-seeking activities are very costly and the party is unlikely to help. The high cost
of elections, therefore, tempts candidates into seeking illegal campaign contributions’
(2005: 719). Other authors (Golden, 2003; Hicken and Simmons, 2008), pointing in
a similar direction, argue that the widespread cultivation of a personal vote breeds
bureaucratic inefficiencies and an oversupply of particularistic legislation.
At the same time, closed-list electoral systems that create incentives for politicians
to invest in a collective party reputation have also been criticized. Here, the bulk of
criticism revolves around the fact that lawmakers have no direct ties with voters, which
means that holding individual politicians accountable is very difficult. Some scholars
have argued that, similar to preferential list systems and non-list systems with multi-
member districts, these institutional properties facilitate corruption and hinder good
governance (for example, Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman, 2005).
Reviewing single-country studies: there is no ‘Asian model’
To sum up the preceding section, academic work on the effects of electoral systems
has mainly focused on the interparty dimension – that is, the question of how electoral
systems affect the distribution of parliamentary seats between parties. On the other
hand, the question of how electoral rules shape the allocation of seats within parties –
in other words, the intraparty dimension of electoral competition – has been largely
ignored.
Proponents of the ‘Asian model’ hypothesis, too, follow the dominant conceptual
framework and analyze electoral reform primarily along the interparty dimension.
The argument goes that established parties – contrary to the global trend towards the
consensus model of democratic politics – have deliberately engineered lower levels of
electoral proportionality as part of a largermove to strengthen themajoritarian features
of their respective political systems.
More specifically, the ‘Asian model’ hypothesis is based on the observation
that democracies in the region have either (a) reduced the size of their electoral
constituencies or (b) adopted a particular subtype of mixed-member electoral systems:
mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems with a high share of seats set aside for
single-member districts (SMD) (see Table 1). MMM systems, in general, have been
found to produce less proportional results than the second subtype of mixed-member
systems – mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems – because the nominal tier and
the party list tier are not linked in the allocation of seats to parties, meaning that ‘the
typical majoritarian boost received by a large party in the nominal tier is not likely to
be wiped away by proportional allocation from the list tier’ (Shugart and Wattenberg,
2001: 13).
Overall, these electoral system choices are interpreted ‘as an attempt by Asia-
Pacific governments tominimize the threat of political fragmentation by restricting the
electoral prospects of minor parties and (not incidentally) promoting the interests of
incumbents’ (Reilly, 2007a: 1359–60). However, as this section will show, single-country
analyses of recent electoral reform in East Asia do not agree with this assessment.
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Rethinking the case selection
Before reviewing the body of single-country studies, however, it seems necessary
to first discuss which cases to include in this review. In particular, it is questionable
whether – for conceptual and empirical reasons – the Philippines and South Korea do
indeed constitute cases of electoral reform towards MMM, as advocates of the ‘Asian
model’ hypothesis claim.
In the Philippines, the provision for the implementation of a mixed-member
electoral systemhad originally beenwritten into the 1987 constitution after the downfall
of theMarcos regime. However, subsequently, established political parties – dominated
by politicians from the traditional oligarchic elite (trapos) – gutted the reformprovision
by formulating the electoral law in such a way that it would ‘divide mass-based
organizations and progressive groups’ (Wurfel, 1997: 27). Therefore, although the
Filipino electoral system could technically be classified as MMM, it contains a number
of technical features that make it distinctively unique. Most remarkably, the top five
parties in the previous House of Representatives election may not compete in the party
list tier and there is a ‘cap’ of three seats per party in the list system.3 As a result,
‘overall the party-list system in its current form has not made much of an impact on
the trapo system. Traditional politicians representing different factions of the elite still
constitute the overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress and they continue
to operate as before’ (Quimpo, 2005: 18). As even the chair of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), Sixto Brillantes, has called the party-list tier a ‘joke’ (Philippine
3 The cap means that, no matter how many votes a party gathers through the party list system, the party
will only win a maximum of three seats. In combination with a 2 per cent threshold for the allocation
of list seats, this can lead to a situation where not all of the list seats are filled. For example, in the 1998
elections – the first election under the new rules – only 28 out of 50 seats were filled.
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Daily Inquirer, 2012), it thus seems more appropriate to classify the Filipino electoral
system as single-member plurality (SMP).
South Korea, too, should be excluded from the sample of cases. This is because
Korea had already implemented a MMM electoral system for the first free elections in
1988, while subsequent reform was aimed at achieving a higher level of proportionality
rather than a lower level. Most significantly, electoral reform in 2004 introduced a
second vote, allowing voters to cast separate votes for an individual candidate in the
SMD tier and for a closed party list in the PR tier. Supporters of electoral reform hoped
that this two-ballot system ‘would reduce the effects of regionalism in the distribution
of [SMD] seats and strengthen proportionality and minority representation’
(Cho, 2005: 526).
Having excluded the Philippines and South Korea from the sample of relevant
cases, this leaves us with four democracies worth closer investigation: Japan, Taiwan,
Thailand, and Indonesia.4 A large body of single-country studies has emerged in recent
years, analyzing electoral reform in each of the four democracies. Taken together, these
studies tell a very different story to the ‘Asian model’ account. First of all, there appears
to be general agreement that pressure for electoral reform had built up because the old
electoral systems were perceived to facilitate pervasive ‘money politics’ and corruption.
Concerns over government stability and blackmailing by smaller parties, on the other
hand, had not been important drivers for reform. Second, single-country studies
suggest that, despite this pressure, electoral reform was difficult to achieve because
– in line with the dominant rational-choice approach to electoral system design (see
Colomer, 2005; Shugart, 1998) – political parties’ electoral system preferences clashed.
In Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia, contention largely revolved around the question
of proportionality: small parties wanted a proportional electoral system, while larger
parties advocated a more disproportional system. In Thailand, rural-based political
parties blocked electoral reform because they benefited from the candidate-centered
electoral system more than Bangkok-based parties. In other words, single-country
studies suggest that, in all four democracies, the final outcome of electoral reform
was a compromise between self-interested political parties. In no case do these studies
imply that there was a concerted effort across parties to implement more majoritarian
electoral institutions.
Explaining the implementation of MMM: Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand
Starting with the question of how electoral reform made it onto the political
agenda, qualitative analyses seem to agree that – in Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand – the
mechanical incentives for cultivating a personal vote were the most important factor.
Both Japan and Taiwan employed single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – a nominal
4 Technically speaking, Taiwan – similar to South Korea – already had a MMM system in place for the
first democratic elections. However, this systemwas highly unusual in that it combined SNTV (nominal
tier) with a closed-list PR.
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electoral system with multi-member districts. Crucially, SNTV provides voters with
only one vote, which – as the name suggests – is non-transferable, meaning that voters
are not given the opportunity to rank order candidates.5 Candidates of the same party
therefore compete for the same votes. Thailand, on the other hand, used a block vote
system to elect the lower chamber of parliament. Block vote resembles SNTV in all
aspects, except that voters are given as many votes as there are seats to be filled in
a constituency. Although this feature allows parties aiming to win a parliamentary
majority to nominate a full slate of candidates and instruct their voters to give all
their votes to the party’s slate, block vote still provokes intense intraparty competition
(Hicken, 2006a: 49–50). Accordingly, in all three countries, politicians made use of the
full arsenal of particularistic strategies outlined earlier to differentiate themselves from
their co-partisan contenders.
In Japan, politicians of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) relied on a
mix of three primary strategies to cultivate a personal vote. First, candidates established
clientelistic machines – the famous koenkai – at the local level: bymeans of the koenkai,
‘the politician sponsors various activities which serve to give him publicity and contact
with large number of the electorate. Through such activities . . . participants are
gradually made to feel a sense of identification with the politician’ (Curtis, 1971: 132).
In addition to developing emotional bonds, politicians also designed the koenkai to
provide members with material benefits, ‘ranging from providing tax advice to fixing
traffic tickets and job hunting on behalf of constituents, their relatives and friends’
(Fukui and Fukai, 1999: 127). Second, politicians laid virtual ‘pipelines of pork’ that
delivered public funds to local politicians, who, in return, mobilized voters to support
the respective politician in national elections (Fukui and Fukai, 1996). Third, through
participation in the LDP’s Policy Affairs and Research Council (PARC) – which had
the power to veto all emerging policy proposals before these were introduced to the
Diet – politicians had the opportunity to ‘press for policies and budget allocations
that benefit[ed] their constituents’ (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1997: 32). Politicians
used the complex divisional structure of the PARC to carve out a certain policy niche,
which, in turn, allowed them to claim credit for corresponding interest groups in their
constituency, such as agricultural cooperatives or doctors’ associations.
In Taiwan, the former regime party, the Kuomintang (KMT), opted for a
centralized distribution of particularistic goods: in the SNTV system’s multi-member
constituencies, candidates were allocated so-called ‘responsibility zones’ and subjected
to penalties if they campaigned outside their own zone (Liu, 1999). To assist candidates
in their campaigns, the KMT maintained a party-controlled vote-buying system that
connected the party headquarters to local vote brokers (called tiau-a-ka in Taiwanese),
most of whom were recruited among local politicians, criminal gang leaders, heads
of voluntary organizations, or business owners (Chin, 2003: 136). Where possible,
the KMT relied on local factions (difang paixi) – large interpersonal networks held
5 Or put in more technical terms, SNTV uses a categorical ballot, rather than an ordinal ballot.
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together by informal social ties (such as kin, friendship, neighborhood, school) –
which provided ‘ready-made’ networks of vote brokers. In return for their electoral
support, local factions were supplied with a variety of resources, ranging from
economic privileges (such as special loans by provincial banks or contracts for public
construction projects) to protection for illegal businesses (for example, brothels and
gambling dens) and employment in party-owned enterprises (Fields, 2002). Moreover,
local faction members were often themselves nominated as candidates for public
elections.
Finally, in Thailand, to differentiate themselves from co-partisan contenders,
candidates mainly relied on vote buying, based on dense networks of hua khanaen
(a termbest translated as ‘canvassers’)whowould serve as the linkbetween thepolitician
and the voter at the local level (Surin andMcCargo, 1997). Similar to Taiwan, these vote
brokers were usually recruited among individuals with significant influence within
their community (such as village heads, businessmen, or teachers) – that is, among
any social group able to deliver a block of votes. The most sought-after hua khanaen
were criminal ‘godfathers’ (chao pho), who not only provided an efficient network to
organize vote buying but whose corrupt ties to government officials often made them
exempt from law (Ockey, 2000).
Although electoral systems certainly played an important role in shaping
politicians’ approach to voter mobilization, it needs to be pointed out that these
particularistic strategies were also facilitated by contextual factors. For example, on the
‘demand side’, it can be observed that clientelism and vote buying were more efficient
when targeting certain voter groups. For example, in Japan, two parallel party systems
emerged: one rural, LDP dominated, clientelistic system and one programmatic urban
system (Scheiner, 2006: 156–83). Similarly, in Thailand, the density of vote broker
networks became a deciding factor for electoral success in the rural impoverished parts
of the country, not somuch in urban areas (Surin andMcCargo, 1997: 139). In Japan and
Taiwan – which had witnessed decades of impressive economic growth – ‘supply-side’
factors also mattered to a large extent. More specifically, access to the resources of the
‘developmental state’ proved key for maintaining clientelistic linkages with an ever-
more affluent electorate (Hellmann, 2013). Parties that were permanently excluded
from the distribution of public resources under the one-party dominant systems –
such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) or the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) – were unable to engage in clientelism but had to appeal to voters through
programmatic policy packages instead.
Nevertheless, although the picture was much more complex than a mono-causal
institutional explanation, electoral systems were increasingly blamed for a number of
political and economic problems.
In Japan, the issue of electoral reform was catapulted onto the political agenda as
early as 1954, when the so-called Shipbuilding Scandal publicly highlighted the negative
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drawbacks of SNTV.6 As a response, the Hatoyama government put forward a proposal
to introduce an SMP system, but this particular proposal was objected to by smaller
oppositionparties for its potentiallydisproportional effects. Still, over thenextdecades–
driven by skyrocketing campaigning costs and chronic, large-scale corruption scandals
– electoral reform continued to feature high on the agenda.However, although the need
to abolish SNTV was widely acknowledged, parties remained unable to agree on an
alternative electoral system: the dominant LDP persisted on a system based primarily
on SMDs, while smaller parties pushed for PR.
It was only in the early 1990s after the Japanese financial bubble had burst –
the symptom of a deeper economic crisis for which SNTV was indirectly blamed7 –
that political parties ‘softened’ their positions on electoral reform: while the LDP
came to advocate MMM, smaller parties now promoted MMP. Critically, the deadlock
was broken when two smaller parties switched over to the MMM camp – for purely
rational calculations: the Komeito had plans to merge with a large LDP splinter party;
the JSP did not want to end up as ‘the party that killed reform’ (Reed and Thies,
2003: 171).
In Taiwan, too, electoral reform was hindered as parties clashed on the question
of how proportional the new system should be. When, in 1994, the KMT proposed to
replace SNTV with a Japanese-style MMM system, other parties – although generally
recognizing the need for electoral reform – rejected this proposal.8 Instead, the main
opposition party, the DPP, pushed for MMP, arguing that, because MMMdoes not use
the party-list tier to compensate for the disproportionality in the SMP tier, smaller
parties would suffer a serious disadvantage under the KMT’s proposal. However,
similar to Japan – driven by growing public concern over ‘money politics’, inefficient
policymaking, and the ever-closer links betweenorganized crime andpolitics – electoral
reform remained high on the political agenda. In fact, the DPP turned the ‘black gold’
issue into a very effective campaign topic (Fell, 2005). Hence, after unexpectedly losing
the 2000 presidential elections, the KMT submitted a new proposal for an MMM
system. And this time the DPP accepted the proposal – for a simple, rational reason:
before the 2000 elections, the voter base of the KMT had been split in two, as the
charismatic James Soong had left the party to establish the People First Party (PFP).
6 For an outline of how the decade-long electoral reform debate in Japan unfolded, see Reed and Thies
(2003) and Shiratori (1995).
7 Critics argued that candidates’ policy specialization through the LDP’s PARC had given rise to a ‘dual
economy’ inwhichhighly competitive export-oriented companies co-existedwithuncompetitive sectors
– such as agriculture – that enjoyed significant clientelistic protection and subsidization.
8 To understand why the KMT advanced a proposal for electoral reform, it is necessary to know the
details of Taiwan’s electoral system.Crucially, because electoral district boundaries corresponded to local
administrative units, the electoral system not only contained multi-member districts (SNTV) but also
a number of single-member districts (SMP). The push for a fully fledged SMP system becomes rational
when one considers that, in the 1994 Legislative Yuan election, despite almost losing its parliamentary
majority, the KMT was able to win all SMDs (Lin, 2006: 124).
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With the conservative camp divided, the DPP now calculated that it would gain a
significant advantage in the SMP tier (Chang and Chang, 2009).
While, in Japan and Taiwan, the initiative for electoral reform thus came from
within the party system – albeit, admittedly, fueled by deep public dissatisfaction –
in Thailand the main drive for reform had to come from outside the political
establishment. Critically, parliament was dominated by politicians who owed their
electoral success to vote-broker networks in rural areas and thus directly benefited
from the block vote system; only Bangkok-based politicians demonstrated enthusiasm
for electoral reform (McCargo, 1998: 18). However, with ‘money politics’ reaching
epidemic proportions in the 1980s, external pressure on parliament increased. In 1991,
the military even launched a coup, with the proclaimed objective being ‘to clean up
the political system, remove the corrupt politicians, and then return to a purified
democracy’ (Ockey, 2001: 206). When – after the re-establishment of democracy –
the same politicians came to dominate government, it was an incoherent coalition
of business groups, NGOs, and the media that kept electoral reform on the political
agenda (Connors, 2002: 42). At this point, contention shifted to the question of how to
proceed with reform: while established parties insisted on parliamentary involvement,
the reform movement aimed at bypassing parliament. In the end a settlement was
reached that lockedMPs out of the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) but allowed
parliament to nominate 76 members from a group of 760 provincial representatives
and 23 experts from a list compiled by universities.
The 1997 constitution that came out of the CDA ‘reflected a variety of compromises
between competing interest groups’ (McCargo, 1998: 26). In terms of electoral reform,
the new constitution replaced the block vote system with an MMM system. A strong
SMD tier was chosen to produce legislators that ‘were directly answerable to their
constituents’ (Murray, 1998: 533). Moreover, it was calculated that reducing the size of
electoral districts would lower the costs for campaigning, thus allowing less well-off
candidates to contest seats. Theobjective of the party list, on the other hand,was to allow
the electorate to express their preferences alongparty lines and force parties to nominate
higher-quality candidates (Surin, 2002: 195–7). The nominal tier and the party-list tier
were kept separate for the allocation of seats to undermine the proliferation of small
parties and thus reduce government instability. Crucially, the instability of multi-party
governments was seen as ‘[o]ne of the main culprits militating against establishing
effective measures to deal with corruption’ (Borwornsak and Burns, 1998: 237).
The government at the time initially rejected the CDA’s draft of a new constitution.
However, when the Thai economy took a nosedive 1997, public pressure for reform
became too strong to withstand. Of most relevance here, the electoral system’s
mechanical incentives for cultivating a personal vote were, similar to Japan, indirectly
blamed for economic crisis. In particular, it was understood that the highly personalistic
style of elections had undermined parties’ ability to formulate coherent, sustainable
policies, contributed to the politicizationof the bureaucracy, anddiscouraged industrial
upgrading (Doner and Ramsay, 2000: 173–4).
286 olli hellmann
Explaining the reduction of district magnitude: Indonesia
Indonesia had traditionally used closed-list PR systemwith constituencies identical
to the country’s provinces – a system borrowed from the Dutch colonialists and
originally implemented in 1953. However, as explained earlier, closed-list systems have
generally been criticised for making it very difficult for voters to hold individual
politicians accountable. And it was precisely such concerns over accountability that
put electoral reform on the political agenda in Indonesia. Soon after the transition
to democracy had set in, strong anti-party attitudes developed among voters. With
the euphoria of the first free elections in 1999 fading, many voters began to believe
that parties behaved like those under the autocratic regime – that is, they placed the
personal interests of the political elite ahead of those of ‘the people’ (Johnson Tan,
2002). And political parties’ own actions significantly contributed to these negative
attitudes: before the election, party leaders had literally ‘sold’ places on the party list to
the highest bidders; after the election, lawmakers were put under tremendous ‘pressure
to divert state funds into party coffers, mostly by offering projects to businesses or
individuals closely associated with the party’ (Mietzner, 2007: 247). The publicly visible
results of these hidden mechanisms were a political system plagued by corruption
scandals, and the capturing of political parties by elements of the ancien re´gime and
established oligarchs (Hadiz, 2003).
The need to address the problematic aspects of closed-list PR had already been
recognizedduring thenegotiationsover thenewconstitution.Drivenby theobjective ‘to
make legislators more responsive to their constituents’ (Crouch, 2010: 63) the electoral
reform team appointed after the downfall of Suharto recommended replacing closed-
list PR – which had been in use since 1953 – with open-list PR. The former regime
party, Golkar, supported this proposal, adding the condition that the electoral districts
be drawn along second-level (regency and municipality) – rather than first-level
(province) – administrative boundaries. However, the regime’s two satellite parties
calculated that out of the 310 districts proposed by Golkar, 260 (84 per cent) were too
small in population to qualify for more than one seat. In other words, the outcome
would have been a system allocating most seats through SMP. The smaller parties
thus rejected the proposal, based on the concern that, Golkar – due to the fact that
local bureaucratic structures had been strongly integrated into the party – would have
enjoyed a significant competitive advantage in SMDs (King, 2003: 61–2).
Because parties were unable to agree on an alternative, the closed-list electoral
system remained in place for the 1999 elections. After the elections, parties returned to
the question of electoral reform. However, as Golkar refused to drop its demands that
electoral districts be based on second-level administrative units, interparty negotiations
soon reached a deadlock again. In the end, a rather weak consensuswas reached: the size
of electoral districts was moderately decreased – provinces remained the basic unit, but
larger provinces were split into smaller multi-member districts – and amere flexible list
systemwas introduced.Under this flexible list system, voterswere given the opportunity
to choose individual candidates but candidates had to reach a certain quota of votes (30
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per cent of all votes in a given constituency) to be elected directly. If candidates failed
to reach the quota, the rank orderings provided by the parties determined the winning
candidates.9
It was only when, before the 2009 elections, the Constitutional Court ruled that the
flexible list system violated democratic principles that a fully fledged open-list system
was introduced.
A quantitative visualization of reform: ‘normalizing’ electoral
systems
The discussion so far has revealed that there are two competing interpretations of
electoral reform inAsia.While the ‘Asianmodel’ hypothesis argues that electoral reform
has to be understood as part of a larger project to engineer majoritarian democracy,
single-country studies suggest that the main driver for reform was the perceived need
to fight ‘money politics’ and corruption. The two interpretations thus focus on very
different aspects of electoral systems.Whereas the ‘Asianmodel’ hypothesis emphasizes
the interparty dimension, arguing that electoral reform was aimed at decreasing the
proportionality in the allocation of seats between parties, single-country studies stress the
importance of the intraparty dimension, highlighting how electoral reformers intended
to re-design the allocation of seats between candidates, thereby reducing institutional
incentives for politicians to engage in corrupt activities.
To adjudicate between these two contrasting hypothesis, the following section
will ‘map’ electoral reform in a two-dimensional space – constituted by the interparty
and intraparty dimensions – using a quantitative framework developed by Shugart
(2001, 2003). This exercise will demonstrate that the most significant transformation
of electoral systems in Asia over the last two decades has happened on the intraparty
rather than the interparty dimension, thus adding further evidence to existing work
that denies the ‘Asian model’ hypothesis. In fact, the mapping exercise will show that
institutional reform has meant that electoral systems in Asia – rather than bucking
global trends – have converged towards the ‘efficient’ ideal on both the interparty and
intraparty dimension.
According to Shugart, the interparty dimension ‘concerns the tradeoff between
polities that provide choices of government before elections and those that offer
choices of parties that form governments after elections’ (2003: 30; emphasis added
by the author); the intraparty dimension, on the other hand, ‘concerns the extent to
which legislative candidates depend on their own personal reputations, as opposed
to the reputation of their parties, to gain election’ (ibid: 36; emphasis added by
the author). On each dimension, Shugart identifies two extremes: pluralitarian and
hyper-representative systems on the interparty dimension, and hyper-centralized and
hyper-personalistic systems on the intraparty dimension. On the interparty dimension,
9 As a matter of fact, in the 2004 elections, only two candidates met the required quota. The closed list
system thus effectively stayed in place.
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the ‘efficient’ ideal between the two extremes is a situation where voters can identify
clear government alternatives in the election campaign and the government that
subsequently forms represents a majority of the electorate. On the other hand, on
the intraparty dimension, ‘electoral efficiency refers to the simultaneous accountability
of legislators to constituents and to their party’ (Shugart, 2001: 175).
To measure electoral systems’ position on the interparty dimension Shugart
suggests three empirical indicators: pre-election identifiability (did an election provide
voters with clear choices of competing governments prior to elections?),10 majority
approximation (how closely did an election outcome approximate a majority of seats
for a single party or a pre-election coalition?),11 and plurality enhancement (to what
extent, in a given election, did the largest party or pre-election coalition found its
plurality of votes enhanced through the votes-to-seats conversion process?).12 Shugart
then uses these three variables to calculate the index of interparty efficiency.13 Very
negative values of interparty efficiency indicate hyper-representative systems, while
highly positive values denote a pluralitarian system.
Shugart’s index of intraparty efficiency, on the other hand, is based on three
components – ballot, vote, and district – with negative scores on any component
pushing the electoral system in a candidate-centered direction and positive scores
pushing the system in a party-centered direction.While the ballot component ‘captures
how candidates gain access to the ballot and what the structure of that ballot is’ (ibid:
37),14 the vote component ‘captures thedegree towhichvoters are casting list vs. nominal
votes’ (ibid: 38).15 The decision to also include a district component in the calculation
of the intraparty index is based on Carey and Shugart’s (1995: 430) argument that ‘the
10 Pre-election identifiability (ID) of electoral systems is scored as follows: each election in which there
was a clear choice among competing governments presented to voters is scored 1.00; elections in which
there were two opposing blocs but neither could form a government without the support of parties
that remained unaligned are scored 0.75; elections in which one side of the left–right divide was clear
to voters but the other side was inchoate are scored 0.50; and elections in which the array of parties
presented no effective means for voters to cast a meaningful vote for the government they preferred are
scored 0.00.
11 The score for majority approximation (MA) is derived as follows: if a majority was obtained, MA = 1;
if no majority was obtained, the formula is MA = s/0.5 (where s is the share of seats obtained by the
largest party or pre-election coalition among those who participated in the government formed after
the election).
12 The equation to calculate plurality enhancement (P), using the largest party/bloc’s seat share (s) and
vote share (v), is: P = (s/0.5)–(v/0.5).
13 The first step is to calculate electoral linkage (L), which is the average of pre-election identifiability (ID)
andmajority approximation (MA). The index is then derived through a simple formula: Einter = L–1+P
(where P is plurality enhancement).
14 The coding of the ballot component is as follows: (2) ballot access through approval of party elite only
and votersmay not disturb order of list; (1) ballot access through decentralized internal party procedures
and voters may not disturb list; (0) ballot access dominated by parties but voters may disturb list; (−1)
ballot access in general election requires first surviving a preliminary round of popular voting; (−2)
ballot access nearly unrestricted.
15 The vote component is coded as follows: (2) vote is list only; (1) vote is list or nominal but list votes
predominate; (0) vote is nominal only butmay pool or transfer to other candidates; (−1) vote is nominal
electoral reform in asia 289
importance of personal reputation . . . increases with magnitude in those systems in
which co-partisans compete with each other for votes and seats’.16 To calculate the index
of intraparty efficiency the component scores are not added up but Shugart offers a
more qualitatively derived ranking, taking into consideration the different party and
personal reputation incentives provided by ‘real world’ examples of electoral systems
(Shugart, 2003: 39).
Having outlined the methodological details, it becomes evident that Shugart’s
two-dimensional model of electoral systems can be criticized on two points. First,
the underlying measurements of each dimension do not correspond to each other:
to construct the index of interparty efficiency, Shugart draws on the outcomes that
electoral systems produce; to build the index of intraparty efficiency, Shugart uses the
institutional properties of electoral systems. Second, the ballot component of the index
of intraparty efficiency takes into consideration procedures of candidate selection.
This, however, is – in the rigorous technical sense – an institutional property of party
organization, not of electoral systems. In particular, within the same party system,
parties may adopt different methods to select candidates for public election – some
may grant participatory rights to members and ordinary voters, somemaymonopolize
decision making in the party leadership.
Nevertheless, Shugart’s index of intraparty efficiency is still the best measure
available to assess how electoral systems shape the personal representation of voters.
Crucially, we still lack a direct and straightforward indicator of the personal vote,
which means that, inevitably, we have to rely on the second-best solution: the question
of whether electoral systems provide incentives for either cultivating a personal vote or
collectively investing in the reputation of the party.
If we apply Shugart’s two-dimensional framework to the democracies of Asia,
it becomes clear that electoral systems have mainly been stretched out towards the
extreme ends on the intraparty dimension (see Figure 1). The general deviation from
themidpoint on the interparty dimension, on the other hand, has beenmuch smaller –
in particular, there has never been a strong pull towards the pluralitarian end.
Strikingly, all democracies – with the exception of South Korea – have, at
some point, employed electoral systems close to the extreme ends on the intraparty
dimension. Japan and Taiwan even used the most candidate-centered electoral system
in the world: SNTV.17 SNTV, according to Shugart (2003: 38), ‘puts a greater premium
than any other [system] on a candidate’s ability to garner a personal vote because
votes cannot be pooled with co-partisans or transferred to other candidates’. Thailand’s
or list but nominal votes predominate and pool to other candidates; (−2) vote is nominal only and
non-transferable.
16 The district component is coded as follows: (1) district magnitude greater than one, with vote >0; (0)
district magnitude of one; (−1) district magnitude greater than one, with vote0, provided that ballot
0 (vote and ballot refer to the two other components).
17 For the sake of a complete picture, it should be pointed out that SouthKorea used SNTVunder autocratic
rule from 1972 until 1988.
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Figure 1. Electoral reform in Asia Source: Author’s own compilation based on data from
Table A1 and Table A2 in the appendix.
block vote system, as explained earlier, also created strong incentives for cultivating a
personal vote – albeit, because giving voters as many votes as there are seats to be filled
in a constituency, to a lesser extent than SNTV (Carey and Shugart, 1995: 427).
The Indonesian closed-list PR system, in contrast, was located at the hyper-
centralized extreme of the intraparty dimension, as it only offered voters a choice
between closed lists in large multi-member districts. At the same time, political
parties were characterized by a lack of party internal democracy, placing control over
the compilation of candidate lists tightly within the party leadership – a pattern
of party internal power distribution that had its origin in Suharto’s autocratic
regime but continued after the transition to democracy (Hellmann, 2011: 134–7).
Unlike the hyper-personalistic systems discussed so far, Indonesia’s hyper-centralized
system thus, effectively, provided no incentive for candidates to attend to personal
reputations.
Certainly, electoral systems in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines)
have to some extent also been pulled towards the hyper-representative extreme on
the interparty dimension. However, here we need to take into consideration the
different measurement rules underpinning each of the dimensions: because the index
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of interparty efficiency is based on outcomes – rather than institutional properties –
it is important to acknowledge other factors to explain why these electoral systems
have failed to produce clear choices of government. For example, as outlined earlier,
whether pluralitarian/majoritarian systems reduce the number of parties depends to a
large extent on the level of party system institutionalization, while, under permissive
electoral rules, it is ultimately the degree of social diversity that shapes the number of
parties. The case of the Philippines perfectly illustrates the first point. Although SMP is
used to elect theHouse of Representatives, the party system remains highly fragmented,
mainly because ‘politics is determined by fights among clans and is, thus, extremely
unpredictable’ (Ufen, 2008a: 345). For the case of Indonesia, on the other hand, it could
be argued that the PR system only produces a multi-party system because of the large
number of social cleavages.18
So far, themapping exercise supports the interpretation of electoral reform offered
by single-country studies: pressure for reform had built up because electoral systems
either sat at the hyper-personalistic (Japan, Taiwan, Thailand) or hyper-centralized
(Indonesia) ends of the intraparty dimension. While the hyper-personalistic systems
encouraged particularistic policy-making – which, in the cases of Japan and Thailand,
arguably contributed to major economic crises – under Indonesia’s hyper-centralized
system voters were effectively denied the ability to monitor and punish individual
legislators. In all four countries, these ‘extreme’ mechanical features were perceived to
facilitate widespread corruption and ‘money politics’.
Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 1, reform mainly pushed electoral systems
along the vertical intraparty axis; reform-induced movement on the horizontal
interparty axis, in contrast, has been rather limited. In Indonesia, the reduction
of district magnitude has not encouraged the emergence of clearer government
alternatives, as the party system remains highly fragmented. In Japan and Taiwan,
the large share of SMDs under the new MMM systems did nothing to push interparty
competition towards a more pluralitarian logic. Crucially, even before reform, SNTV –
although producing highly proportional results19 – had facilitated the emergence of
two opposing party blocs. This feature can be explained by referring back to the earlier
discussion of how the LDP and the KMT monopolized access to public resources for
the maintenance of patron–client networks, which allowed for the consolidation of
one-party dominant systems.
The only country thatmade a significant jump towardsmore pluralitarian election
outcomes is Thailand. However, it needs to be stressed that this was not only due
to electoral reform. For example, the 1997 constitution contained a number of other
provisions that helped to drive down thenumber of political parties –most importantly,
18 Althoughweakening in their structuring effect, social cleavages are still an important predictor of voting
behavior in Indonesia. Ufen (2008b) distinguishes five such cleavages: center vs. periphery, secularism
vs. Islam, modernist Islam vs. traditionalist Islam, capital vs. labor, and status quo vs. political reform.
19 SNTV can produce relatively proportional results, comparable to the d’Hondt method of proportional
representation (see Cox, 1991).
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stricter restrictions on party switching and the stipulation that cabinet members would
have to resign from parliament (Hicken, 2006b: 392; Kuhonta, 2008).
The implementation ofMMM systemsmeans that Japan, Taiwan and Thailand are
nowplacedclose to the intersectionof the interparty and intraparty axes– that is, close to
the electoral ‘efficiency’ ideal on both the interparty and intraparty dimension. On the
interparty dimension, the MMM systems encourage clearly identifiable government
alternatives (through the SMD tier), while, at the same time, guaranteeing the
representationof smallerparties (through thePR tier).On the intrapartydimension, the
MMMsystems provide incentives for some candidates to specialize in representing local
constituencies (through the SMD tier) and some to specialize in providing collective
goods associated with a party label (through the PR tier).
Indonesia also moved considerably closer to the ‘efficiency’ mid-point on the
intraparty axis, as the open-list system now gives voters the opportunity to voice their
preferences for individual candidates and influence the order of the list. However, the
final product of the reform process overshot the ‘target’ and displays a strong tendency
towards the hyper-personalistic end.
To sum up, after mapping electoral systems in a two-dimensional space we need to
conclude that single-country studies offer a more plausible interpretation of electoral
reform than the ‘Asian model’ hypothesis. Impetus for reform came from the fact that
electoral systems displayed highly problematic features on the intraparty dimension.
Moreover, reform mainly shifted electoral systems towards the mid-point between the
hyper-centralized and hyper-personalistic extremes; movement along the interparty
dimension, on the other hand, has been rather limited. As such, electoral systems in
Asia – togetherwith other electoral systems around theworld (see Shugart, 2001, 2003) –
seem to be converging on the ideal of electoral ‘efficiency’ rather than running ‘directly
counter to the experience of other democratizing world regions’, as Reilly (2007a: 1351)
claims.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the institutional element of personal representation –
as opposed to party representation – provides the most useful lens through which to
understand recent cases of electoral reform in East Asia. Several democracies in the
region have over the past two decades replaced their extreme systems on the intraparty
dimension with more moderate types: Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand made the shift
from hyper-personalistic systems to MMM; Indonesia moved away from the hyper-
centralized end of the spectrum by implementing an open-list electoral system.
In all four countries, growing public discontent with these ‘extreme’ systems set
the context for electoral reform: hyper-personalistic systems – because they provoked
competition between candidates of the same party – were increasingly blamed for
particularistic policy making; Indonesia’s hyper-centralized system, on the other hand,
came under fire because it denied voters the ability to hold individual politicians
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accountable. In short, the public began pointing at these ‘extreme’ mechanical features
as the main cause for widespread ‘money politics’ and corruption.
The new electoral systems that were subsequently implemented to address these
problems – in particular, the MMM systems in Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand – sit very
close to the ‘efficiency’ midpoints on both the intraparty and interparty dimensions.
This suggests that electoral reform should not be seen as part of a wider project
to engineer a majoritarian ‘Asian model’ of democracy. Instead, electoral systems
in Asia seem to be following the global trend in electoral system design away from
‘extreme’ types. However, the argument put forward here is not that politicians in
Asian democracies deliberately designed electoral ‘efficiency’. Rather, as the review of
single-country studies has shown, the more ‘efficient’ electoral systems were largely the
product of negotiations between self-interested, rationally driven political parties.
The question that this article has not answered is howmuch of an impact electoral
reform has had on ‘money politics’ and corruption. If we follow the general findings
of neo-institutional approaches to corruption, the prospects are bleak: once politicians
have invested in corrupt networks and a positive feedback loop reinforces individual
incentives for corruption, changing the formal rules of the political game (such as
electoral systems) is unlikely to persuade politicians to pull out of the corruption
market (della Porta and Vannucci, 2012). However, only future research will show
whether these general expectations also hold in Asia.20
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Appendix
Table A1. Scores on the intraparty dimension
Component scores
Country Description of electoral system ballot vote district Index score
Indonesia 1 closed-list PR w/ centralized nomination 2 2 1 1.00
Indonesia 2 open-list PR 0 –1 –1 –0.71
Japan 1 SNTV –2 –2 –1 –1.00
Japan 2 MMMa 0 –2 0 0.00
Korea 1 MMM (single vote) 0 –2 0 0.15
Korea 2 MMM (two votes) 0 –2 0 0.07
Philippines SMP w/ unrestricted access to ballot –2 –2 0 –0.86
Taiwan1 MMM (nominal tier = SNTV) –2 –2 –1 –0.60
Taiwan 2 MMM (nominal tier = SMP) 0 –2 0 0.14
Thailand 1 block voteb –2 –2 –1 –0.93
Thailand 2 MMM 0 –2 0 0.05
Notes: aFollowing Shugart, the score for mixed-member systems has been ‘determined through
careful case-based research of the behavior of members in each tier’ (2003: 41), taking into
account the distribution of seats between the nominal and the PR tier.
bShugart (2003) does not provide scores for the block vote system. However, given that block
vote is almost identical to SNTV – except that voters are given as many votes as there are seats
to be filled in a constituency, which means that co-partisan contenders may secure support from
the same voter – it can be scored close to SNTV.
Source: Author’s own coding (except Japan) based on Shugart (2003).
298 olli hellmann
Table A2. Scores on the interparty dimension
Country ID MA L P Einter
Indonesia 1 0.17 0.54 0.35 0.02 –0.63
Indonesia 2 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.06 –0.60
Japan 1 0.48 0.99 0.74 0.15 –0.12
Japan 2 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.18 0.16
Korea 1 0.58 0.90 0.74 0.19 –0.07
Korea 2 0.75 1.02 0.89 0.20 0.09
Philippines 0.00 0.66 0.33 0.05 –0.62
Taiwan1 0.87 0.97 0.92 0.09 0.02
Taiwan 2 1.00 0.81 0.90 –0.03 –0.12
Thailand 1 0.33 0.52 0.43 0.03 –0.55
Thailand 2 0.69 1.13 0.91 0.20 0.11
Source: Author’s own coding (except Japan) based on Shugart (2003).
Notes: ID = pre-election identifiability; MA = post-election majority approximation; L = electoral
linkage; P = plurality enhancing; Einter = index of interparty efficiency
